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Policy Research Working Paper 5027
This paper solves and estimates a stochastic model of 
optimal inter-temporal behavior to assess how changes 
in the design of the unemployment benefits and pension 
systems in Brazil could affect savings rates, the share of 
time that individuals spend outside of the formal sector, 
and retirement decisions. Dynamics depend on five 
main parameters: preferences regarding consumption 
and leisure, preferences regarding formal Vs. informal 
work, attitudes towards risks, the rate of time preference, 
and the distribution of an exogenous shock that affects 
movements in and out of the social security system (given 
individual decisions). The yearly household survey is used 
to create a pseudo panel by age-cohorts and estimate 
the joint distribution of model parameters based on a 
generalized version of the Gibbs sampler. The model does 
a good job in replicating the distribution of the members 
of a given cohort across states (in or out of the social 
security / active or retired). Because the parameters are 
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related to individual preferences or exogenous shocks, the 
joint distribution is unlikely to change when the social 
insurance system changes. Thus, the model is used to 
explore how alternative policy interventions could affect 
behaviors and through this channel benefit levels and 
fiscal costs. The results from various simulations provide 
three main insights: (i) the Brazilian SI system today 
might generate distortions (lower savings rates and less 
formal employment) that increase the costs of the system 
and might generate regressive redistribution; (ii) there 
are important interactions between the unemployment 
benefits and pension systems, which calls for joint policy 
analysis when considering reforms; and (iii) current 
distortions could be reduced by creating an actuarial link 
between contributions and benefits and then combining 
matching contributions and anti-poverty targeted 
transfers to cover individuals with limited or no savings 
capacity. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Social insurance policies affect individual behaviors and can have non-trivial effects on the 
supply  side  of  the  labor  market.    The  existence  of  mandatory  pensions,  for  instance,  affects 
retirement decisions.  Often, benefit formulas that are not actuarially fair and/or minimum pension 
guarantees induce early withdrawals from the labor force, which increase the cost of the pension 
system and reduce employment levels (see, for instance, Bodor et al. 2008; Jiménez-Martin and 
Sánchez-Martin,  2006;  Blundell  et  al.  2002;  Anderson  et  al.  1999;  Gruber  and  Wise,  1998; 
Samwick,  1998;  Lumsdain  and  Wise,  1994;  and  Fields  and  Mitchel,  1988).    Badly  designed 
retirement income transfers can also reduce incentives to contribute to the social security and 
promote informal work (see Valdez, 2008; and Piggot et al., 2009).   
Unemployment  benefits  schemes  affect  behaviors  as  well.  Unemployment  insurance 
systems, for example, can create moral hazard reducing incentives to search for or keep jobs.  
The literature usually finds a positive correlation between the level of the benefit and its duration, 
and the length of the unemployment spell (see, for instance, Layard et al., 2006; Card and Levine, 
2000;  Calmfors  and  Holmlund,  2000;  Anderson  and  Mayer,  1993;  and  Mayer,  1991).    Even 
funded mandatory unemployment savings accounts which are expected to be incentives neutral 
can,  under  some  circumstances,  have  unintended  consequences  and  induce  more  frequent 
separations and higher turnover (see Vodopivec et al., 2009). 
  More generally, the structure of the bundle of social security benefits and the financing 
mechanism determine the incentives facing individuals to take formal sector jobs (see Perry et al., 
2007; and Levy, 2006). When the bundle includes benefits that are not valued by individuals or 
there is an important redistributive component, part of the social security contribution acts as a tax 
that  can  promote  evasion  and  informal  sector  work.
1  At  the  same  time,  benefits  that  are too 
generous relative to contributions create implicit subsides that can reduce incentives to work and 
save (i.e., self-insure).     
The standard analysis of the economic impacts of policy changes in the social insurance 
system, however, generally ignores these effects or simply makes assumptions about possible 
behavioral responses (see for instance World Bank, 2006).  One reason is that there are no 
econometric  models  linking  the  complex  set  of  rules  of  a  given  system  (say  pensions)  to 
behaviors; there is never enough variation in system parameters to estimate these models. Thus, 
the econometric models that we have tell us how the presence of a social insurance program 
                                                 
1 For a general review of some of the linkages between the social insurance system and the labor market see Krueger 
and Mayer (2002).     4 
affects  a  certain  behavior  but  not  what  would  happen  if  the  rules  of  the  system  change  – 
particularly if one is interested about changes in more than one program.  One could recur to pilot 
ex-post impact evaluations to understand how a given change in policy would affect behaviors 
and ultimately welfare. But these exercises are costly and not very suitable to assess possible 
scenarios for reform. In this case, we argue, a second best is to rely on a behavioral model 
derived from first principles and with the joint distribution of parameters constructed to maximize 
the  likelihood  of  available  data.  This  model  can  then  be  used  to  conduct  simulations  of  the 
potential impacts of alternative policy interventions across the joint distribution. 
This is the approach taken in this paper to analyze the impact that pensions and income 
protection policies in Brazil have on contribution densities, retirement ages, and program costs.  
The model is based on the standard inter-temporal utility maximization framework often used to 
analyze policy issues related to savings and pensions reform (see Kotlikoff, 2000 for a review).  In 
our case, the model takes into account both the pensions and unemployment benefits system 
(which  introduces  uncertainty)  and,  beyond  savings  and  retirement  decisions,  it  endogenizes 
choices about formal vs. informal sector  work.  More precisely, the level of effort invested in 
finding and keeping formal sector jobs.    
An  important  difference  with  prior  work  is  that  instead  of  “calibrating”  the  model,  we 
sample the joint distribution of model parameters to match the time distribution of a representative 
cohort of males (living in urban areas) across three states:  contributing to the social security; 
outside of the social security (i.e., informal sector); or retired. Given the joint distribution we are 
then  able  to  explore  behavioral  responses  to  policy  changes.  Our  focus  is  on  policies  that 
introduce  actuarially  fair  benefit  formulas  (expected  to  be  incentive  neutral;  see  Whitehouse, 
2009) coupled with explicit subsidies for  low-income groups. Given computational constraints, 
however, the analysis ignores the general equilibrium effects of these policies.  In particular, we 
hold constant the current tax-wedge, the interest rate, wages, and labor demand. 
  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Brazilian social insurance 
system and discusses some key stylized facts about labor market dynamics. Section 3 introduces 
the model and explains the methods used to solve the inter-temporal optimization problem and 
perform  simulations.  Section  4  describes  the  strategy  used  to  sample  the  posterior  joint 
distribution of model parameters and assess convergence. Section 5 analyzes model dynamics 
under  the  status-quo  and  looks  at  the  marginal  impact  of  each  of  the  model  parameters  on 
optimal contribution densities and retirement ages. Section 6 and 7 then present the results of the 
policy simulations and summarize the main insights from the analysis and its limitations.       5 
 
2  The Brazilian social insurance system and labor market 
dynamics 
 
Brazil  spends  around  12  percent  of  GDP  on  social  insurance  programs,  which  are 
managed by the National Social Security Institute (INSS) and the Ministry of Labor through the 
Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF). The INSS covers private sector workers and provides old-age, 
disability  and  survivorship  pensions  (RGPS  benefits),  insurance  for  work  accidents,  various 
transfers related to maternity and sickness leave, as well as non-contributory transfers to the poor 
elderly and disabled. The CEF manages the unemployment insurance system and the Length of 
Service  Guarantee  Fund  (FGTS);  the  latter  is  a  mandatory  system  of  funded  unemployment 
individual savings accounts. The RGPS is financed by pay-roll taxes (20% for most employers) 
and social security contributions (8% to 11% depending on the income level).
2 The FGTS also 
uses a pay-roll tax of 8% and in addition a dismissal fine of 40% of accumulated assets that is 
deposited into employees’ FGTS account and that can only be cashed on dismissal or other few 
exceptions.  Unemployment  insurance  benefits,  on  the  other  hand,  are  financed  by  the 
proceedings of a 0.65% tax on gross revenues (case of the services sector) and a 1.65% tax on 
value added (case of the industry sector).   
  The RGPS is quite complex; there are in fact three regimes that depend on the retirement 
age and the vesting period:  (i) retirement based on a minimum age (53M/48W) and a minimum 
number  of  years  of  contributions  (30M/25W)  that  pays  a  so  called  Proportional  Length  of 
Contribution  (PLOC)  Pension;  (ii)  retirement  based  on  a  number  of  years  of  contributions 
(35M/30W) and no minimum age that pays a full Length of Contribution (LOC) Pension; and (iii) 
retirement based on age (65M/60W) and a minimum number of years of contributions (15M/15W) 
that pays an Aging Pension. In all cases, the pension system guarantees a top-up so that the 
minimum pension (Piso Previdenciário) is equal to the minimum wage.
3  Pensions are indexed by 
inflation, but it is worth mentioning that in recent years the minimum wage had a real increase.  
The resulting replacement  rates for the median and the average full-career  workers can vary 
                                                 
2 Since January 2008, because there is no more CPMF, the smallest contribution rate is 8%. 
3 The Brazilian pension system also offers an essentially flat pension equal to the minimum wage to workers in rural 
areas (eligibility ages are 60M/55F)  and to the elderly poor (BPC).  These schemes, however, are not analyzed here.  
For an analysis of the impact of the rural pension on labor supply and retirement ages see Carvalho, 2008.  The effects 
of BPC on labor supply are also analyzed in IPEA (2008). Finally, there is a ceiling of around 340% of average 
earnings to the employee contribution and benefits.    6 
between 40 and over 100 percent depending on the retirement age and the vesting periods (see 
top-left panel of Figure 1).
4   
For the median worker and those with incomes below the median the system provides 
incentives for early retirement. Hence, the “implicit tax” resulting from delaying retirement by one 
year after eligibility to a pension is around 50% of earnings (see top-right panel of Figure 1). At the 
same time, for the median worker, flat Net Expected Life-time Earnings
5 indicate that the system 
provides week incentives to contribute beyond the minimum necessary to be eligible for a pension 
(see bottom left panel Figure 1). This is in part because of the high level of the minimum pension 
and the fact that it is offered as a top-up (there is a 100% marginal tax on each monetary unit 
increase in the contributory pension). On the other hand, for workers earning the average or 
more, the system provides implicit subsidies if they delay retirement (see also Queiroz, 2005 and 
2007 for a discussion about incentives for retirement). As a result, there is a large variation in the 
internal rates of return (IRR) on contributions that workers receive as a function of career histories 
and wage dynamics (see bottom-right panel in Figure 1). This implies considerable implicit and 
non-transparent redistribution.  Also, in the majority of cases, IRRs are above sustainable levels.  
The pension system is thus accumulating unfunded liabilities that cannot be repaid out of future 
contributions and will require intergenerational transfers that can be regressive (see Robalino and 
Bodor 2008 for a discussion of the sustainable IRR of pay-as-you-go systems).   
In terms of income protection, formal sector workers who lose their jobs after a certain 
number of months of contributions become eligible for an unemployment insurance benefit and a 
lump  sum  payment  from  their  unemployment  individual  savings  accounts.  To  be  eligible  for 
unemployment insurance workers need to have held a formal sector job (trabalho with carteira) for 
at least 6 months in the previous 36 month period to the start of the unemployment spell.  The 
duration of the benefit ranges between 3 and 5 months depending on the contribution period.  
With 6 to 11 months workers receive 3 months of benefits, with 12 to 23 they receive 4 months, 
and with 24 to 36 they receive 5 months. The benefit itself depends on earnings and ranges 
between R$350 in 2006 (or around 40% of average earnings) and R$ 654.85.  At the same time, 
workers receive a lump sum equal to the balance accumulated in their FGTS accounts while 
working  in  their  last  job  plus  a  dismissal  fine  equal  to  40%  of  the  accumulated  assets.  As 
previously mentioned, the accumulations are financed with an 8% contribution rate that over a 12 
months period yields a capital more or less equal to one month of salary.     
 
                                                 
4 See Annex 1 for a description of benefit formulas for both pensions and UI.   
5 Net Expected Life Time Earnings are the present value of labor income and pensions over the life cycle.    7 
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Note:  The change in pension wealth (the present value of future pensions) is computed at each retirement age.  A negative value 
indicates individuals loose pension wealth if they delay retirement by one extra year.  Expected life time wealth is defined as the 
present value of all income flows (wages and pensions).  In the calculations it is assumed that earnings in the informal sector (i.e., 
when the individual is not contributing to the social security represent 80% of earnings in the formal sector. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on current legislation. 
 
Overall,  the  replacement  rates  offered  by  the  UI  system  range  between  40  and  100 
percent depending on the level of income. The benefit formula ensures that replacement rates are 
higher for low than for high income workers (see top-left panel of  Figure  2). The duration of 
benefits is also higher for the median worker and below. Taking both UI and FGTS together, the 
median worker can finance between 3.5 and 8 months of salaries depending on the number of 
months of contributions (see top-right panel of Figure 2). Still, redistribution within the system 
seems to be regressive as low income  workers have lower  take-up rates  and lower  average 
benefits (see bottom panels of Figure 2).      
In  terms  of  incentives  the  evidence  is  somewhat  mixed.  The  most  recent  analysis 
suggests that UI does not have a major impact on the duration of unemployment spells and, if 
anything, it is allowing workers to find better jobs (Margolis, 2008). Previous analysis also found 
that UI does not affect significantly unemployment spells, except for those transiting into self-
employment.  Spells in this case are shortened (see Cunnigham, 2002).   
Regarding FGTS, the main concern is that it is providing incentives for fake dismissals as 
workers attempt to cash-out their unemployment savings accounts and/or employers prefer short-  8 
term contracts to avoid paying the dismissal fine (see Barros et al., 1999; and Gonzaga, 2003).  
This can happen if the rates of return on FGTS savings are consistently below market, if the 
mandate for precautionary savings is too high and/or there are credit constraints that impede 
dissavings. In our analysis, however, the focus will be on the effect of FGTS on contribution 
densities and retirement ages.     
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Source:  Authors’ calculations based on legislation and PME survey (Panel Survey of Workers in Metropolitan Areas). 
 
 
In terms of general labor market dynamics, there is evidence of considerable labor mobility 
in Brazil and the existence of a labor market that is not fully segmented.  The average duration of 
formal sector jobs is around 4.5 years, while the duration of self-employment and informal sectors 
jobs is respectively 2.3  years and a little less than one year (see Bosh and Maloney, 2007).  
Unemployment risks are significant, particularly among low income and informal sector workers 
(see  Figure  3). There  is  also  evidence  of  considerable  mobility  between formal  and  informal 
sectors, with flows being often symmetric after controlling for the likelihood of separation (see 
Bosh and Maloney, 2007).
 6  For instance, in a given year, 42.8 percent of informal sector workers 
who separate from their jobs will transit to a formal sector job while 31 percent of formal sector 
workers will transit to an informal sector job.    
                                                 
6 In Brazil informal sector jobs are mainly referred to jobs without social security coverage.  Workers in the informal 
sector are thus workers Sem Carteira, a card that is issued by the Ministry of Labor.   9 
 





























































Source:  Authors’ calculations based on PME. 
 
 
3  The dynamic stochastic behavioral model 
 
We  are  interested  in  formalizing  the  effect  of  the  social  insurance  system  on  three 
economic decisions:  (i) the level of savings; (ii) efforts to preserve/find jobs in the “formal sector” 
(defined by access to social security); and (iii) retirement decisions.  We use as our starting point 
the standard life-cycle utility maximization framework and introduce uncertainty in employment 
status  and  life  expectancy.  Clearly,  the  assumptions  of  this  framework  are  controversial; 
individuals are usually not fully rational and do not have perfect foresight.  If they were, there 
would  not  be  a  need  for  a  social  security  system  in  the  first  place.  The  model/framework  is 
nonetheless useful as a benchmark to understand the direction of change in certain behaviors as 
a response to change in the rules of the social security system.  Moreover, in our application, we 
explore a large range of possible behavioral responses to policy changes. Behaviors that are 
more like to have generated actual observations receive a higher weight.  In essence, we use the 
model as a data generation mechanism and from this point of view it is not very different from 
linear single-equation econometric models. 
 
The dynamic stochastic problem that representative individuals are assumed to solve is 
formally given by:   10 
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where  U(.)  is  a  standard  utility  function  capturing  the  trade-off  between  consumption  (c)  and 
leisure (l); vt is the probability of survival to age t
7;  is the rate of time preference; y is income; w 
is the wage; r the real interest rate; h the available working time during period t; e is equal to one if 
the individual is employed in a “formal sector job” and zero otherwise;  is the social security 
contribution rate (paid by the employee); R is the retirement age; X is the maximum number of 
years a human being can live; a is the entry age to the labor market, and Zt={wt,et,rt}.  The function 
Sp(.) gives the value of the pension at retirement that depends on past wages, interest rates, 
career histories, as well as the parameters ψp of the pension system.  The model allows for work 
after retirement from the mandatory system. Thus, with probability p, individuals who retire work 
in the informal sector at a fraction δp of the formal sector wage.  Similar to pension benefits, the 
function Su(.) gives the value of unemployment benefits which also depend on past values of Z 
and policy parameters ψu.   
One innovation in this model is the formalization of transitions in and out of the social 
security (or between formal and informal jobs). These transitions are assumed to reflect, at least 
in part, decisions by individuals. Clearly, depending on preferences, many workers might not want 
to risk formal sector jobs under any circumstance. Others, on the other hand, are more likely to 
weight  the  pros  and cons  of  formal  vs.  informal  jobs  and  choose  sometimes  the  later.   This 
formulation can be controversial, but seems consistent with the analysis of labor market dynamics 
in Brazil presented in Section 2. 
Thus, we assume that transitions between formal and informal sector jobs can be modeled 
by a Markov-type stochastic process that depends on factors which are exogenous to the worker 
(i.e., that the worker cannot control or change at least in the short term) and factors that are 
endogenous (i.e., that the worker controls). Exogenous factors refer, for instance, to the economic 
                                                 
7 Based on the IBGE’s mortality table.   11 
environment that makes more or less easier finding and keeping jobs (e.g., economic growth, 
firms turnover rates), as well as workers characteristics (e.g., level of education, sector/region 
where the individual works). These exogenous factors are captured by the parameters 0 and 1 
which give respectively the probabilities of finding a job that is covered by the social security if one 
is  outside  (j=0)  or  keeping  a  job  covered  by  the  social  security  (j=1)  if  one  is  inside.    The 
endogenous factors  are  captured  by  the  variable  q  which  represents the  “level  of  effort”  that 
individuals invest in finding or keeping formal jobs. As shown in system (1), q affects directly the 
transition probabilities in and out of the social security. We also assume that effort is “costly” and 
thus utility goes down when q increases (dU/dq<0).  In order to speed-up the algorithm that solves 
the  model,  we  assume  that  q  is  bounded:  0<q<1.  When  q=1  (maximum  effort)  the  Markov 
transition matrix regulating movements in and out of the social security system is characterized by 
0 and 1. When q=0 individuals either do not find jobs or lose jobs with probability 1. This setup is 
similar  to  that  of  Hopenhayn  and  Nicolini  (1997),  although  their  focus  is  on 
employment/unemployment transitions. 
Workers who are not covered by the social security can be working in the informal sector 
or  unemployed.  But  we  assume  that  in  both  cases  individuals  can  cash  their  unemployment 
benefits. Indeed, in practice, it is very difficult to enforce that individuals receiving unemployment 
benefits do not work in the informal sector. Moreover, as discussed in Section 2, transitions in and 
out of the social security are likely to go through periods of unemployment. Here we assume that 
with a certain probability u, individuals who exit the social security system find jobs in the informal 
sector. Wages in the informal sector are a fraction u of wages in the formal sector. 
For the empirical work we use the standard constant risk aversion (CARA) utility function 
that has been adapted to take into account the level of effort put into preserving and/or finding a 
job.  We have: 
      q l c q l c U 2
1 1 1 / ) , , (
1 1  
     
  ,          (2) 
 
where  the  standard  parameters  1  and    capture  respectively  relative  preferences  for 
consumption and leisure and the level of risk aversion. The new parameter is 2 which can be 
thought to capture individual attitudes towards formal sector work. A high/low α2 would indicate 
that  workers  have  low/strong  preferences  for  formal  sector  jobs.  The  formulation  was  mainly   12 
chosen for simplicity.  It implies a constant marginal change in utility as a result of a change in 
effort.
8     
The dynamics of the model thus depend on the vector of parameters ={1,2,,0,1,, 
δ’=δ*p} that needs to be estimated; four exogenous parameters/sequences (δu,u, {wt} and {rt}); 
and  the  rules  of  the  Brazilian  social  insurance  system.  We  set  wt=ξ.W0*(1+g)
t,  where  W0 
represents economy wide average earnings in the base year and ξ captures the level of income of 
the representative individuals in the cohort. Then across simulations we set g=3% and r=4%. In 
addition, using the labor force survey of workers in metropolitan areas (PME) we estimate that 
δu=0.83 and u= 0.7.    
For a given  and ξ we solve the model using a dynamic programming algorithm and 
generate a “behaviors vector” Md(a,e,k,v,R|,ξ) that gives the optimal rule for decision d={q*,c*,R*} 
as a function of the age a of the individual, his/her state e, the level of assets he/she holds, the 
vesting period v (that is the number of years the individual has contributed to the social security), 
and the retirement age R (if retired).  The vesting period is important because of benefit formulas 
in the pension system. 
In the dynamic programming algorithm the vector Md has the following dimensions:  80 
ages, 4 activity states, 250 levels of capital, 45 vesting periods, and up to 20 retirement ages.  
The optimal level of the control variables d is computed recursively at every point in this space 
taking as given the dynamics of wages, the interest rate, the benefits provided by the social 
insurance system, the probabilities of being alive, and the probabilities of loosing/finding a formal 
sector job given the level of effort.  The four states for e are:  (1) out of the social security without 
unemployment benefits; (2) out of the social security receiving benefits; (3) contributing to the 
social security; and (4) retired.  We track separately being out of the social security with or without 
unemployment  benefits  to  control  for  the  fact  that  individuals  cannot  receive  benefits  in  two 
consecutive  periods.    As  for  the  capital  “grid,”  250  points  give  a  reasonable  resolution  for  a 
maximum  capital  equivalent  to  25  times  initial  average  earnings,  so  that  each  grid  point  is 
equivalent to 10% of average earnings.  Still, the numerical approximation results in somewhat 
jittery optimal savings and levels of effort as a function of capital.  Thus, we also use a fourth 
degree polynomial to smooth the optimal values in Md. 
  The  vector  Md  is  then  used  to  simulate  the  behaviors  at  age  a  of  the  representative 
individual across m future states of the world.  Thus, we generate a new vector Cb(a,m|Md(.|,ξ),Е) 
                                                 
8 In a previous version of the model we used         q l c q l c U 2
1 1 1 1 / ) , , (
1 1  
     
  , but this complicates the solution of 
the optimization program without bringing additional insights.   13 
where  b={e,q*,c*,k}  and  E  is  an  m-by-a  vector  of  uniformly  distributed  random  numbers  that 
determine the realizations of the shocks that move individuals in and out of the social security (E 
is fix across simulations).  The vector Cb can then be used to compute the probability that at age 
a, an individual characterized by Md(.|,ξ) would be in a given state e. From Cb one can also 
derive the distribution of other output variables of interest.  We keep track of six:  (i) the present 
value of capital accumulations at age 55; (ii) contribution densities; (iii) the average value of the 
pension at retirement; (iv) the present value of contributory pensions paid; (iv) the present value of 
explicit  subsidies  paid  through  the  pension  system;  (v)  the  present  value  of  unemployment 
insurance benefits; and (vi) the present value of FGTS payments. 
 
4  Strategy to sample the joint distribution of model 
parameters 
 
There are various ways to estimate the joint distribution of model parameters, which as 
usual are constrained by the type of data available and computational power.  The ideal, in terms 
of data, would be to use individual records on career histories (see, for instance, Jiménez-Martin 
and Sánchez-Martín, 2006).  For each individual in the sample (which determines ξ) and for a 
given , Cb(a,m|Md(.|,ξ),Е) would then be used to calculate the likelihood of observing his/her 
career path (taking wages as given) and the distribution of assets at a given age(s). The vector  
would  be  estimated  to  maximize  the  likelihood  of  the  data  set.  The  vector    could  also  be 
estimated for different subgroups characterized, for instance, by level of education and gender.  
Unfortunately,  at  the  time  of  writing,  individual  records  are  still  not  available.  But  in  addition, 
estimating in this way would be computationally very intensive. Indeed, when all the policies are 
“on” solving the model for a given  and ξ takes around 2.5 hours.
9 Furthermore, we are not 
interested in a “point estimate” of  but rather on a joint distribution that allows us to explore policy 
impacts  across  a  large range  of  possible  behaviors.  Otherwise,  one  would  be  assuming that 
preferences  are  more  or  less  the  same  across  individuals  (and  that  preferences  on  various 
dimensions are independent) and then addressing a limited range of uncertainty (on this point see 
Pizer, 1996). 
  In this first application we have opted instead for a Bayesian method to sample the ex-post 
distribution of model parameters. In the absence of individual records we use a pseudo panel of 
age-cohorts derived from the PNAD household survey to construct a targeted distribution by state 
                                                 
9 We work with a server with 8 processors that operate in parallel.  So, individuals could be arranged in 8 groups 
according to their life-time earnings (which is capture by ξ).  In this case, each iteration would take around 2.5 hours.     14 
(contributing to the social security; outside of the social security; unemployed; and retired) for the 
cohort of 25 year old males who entered the labor  market in year 1990 (see Annex 2). The 
distribution is presented in Figure 1. We focus only on urban areas and control for three levels of 
income:  less than 50% of average earnings, between 50 and 75% of average earnings; and more 
than 75%. 
 
Figure 4:  Targeted Distribution for Cohort of 25 Year-Old Males in Urban Region 
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Source:  Household  surveys  1990-2006  PNAD.  The  methodology  to  input  values  for  ages  not  observed  is 
presented in Annex 2. 
  
The main assumption is that the aggregate distributions that we observe are the result of 
millions of individuals making decisions about whether to take formal or informal sector jobs, and 
when to retire. Some individuals, given their individual characteristics and preferences, spend 
most of their active lives in the formal sector. Others are most of the time outside. Yet others 
move in and out with more or less frequency. These various types are determined by the vector .  
The  question  is,  then,  what  is  the  probability  of  observing  a  given    given  the  aggregate 
distribution? Also, we know from Bayes rule that this probability is proportional to the probability of 
observing the data given .  So we have:   
 
      θ θ Y Y θ f L P | |  ,           (3) 
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where Y represent the aggregate distribution of the employment status by age.  The goal is then 
to sample points from the distribution of  in order to maximize the likelihood of the data. Given 
the complexity of the model, however, we cannot sample directly from the posterior distribution.  
We do not have marginal distributions either that would allow us to use the Gibbs sampler (see 
Cassella and George, 1992). Hence, we recur instead to a more general method, the Metropolis-
Hastings (MH) algorithm of which the Gibbs sampler is a particular case (see MacKay, 2003 for a 
presentation).   
  In the MH algorithm we need to assume a prior distribution for each element of   but the 
shape of this distribution does not affect the convergence properties of the algorithm, which are 
discussed in (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1996). Given this distribution the algorithm proceeds as 
follows: 
 
1. Define s=0, basically our priors of the means. 
2. Sample a new ’ from a density    s f θ θ ;
'   
3. Calculate            s s s f L f L d θ θ θ Y θ θ θ Y , | / , ' |
' '    
4. If d>1 then 
'
1 θ θ   s  
5. Otherwise, 
'
1 θ θ   s  with probability d. 
6. Goto 2. 
  
The intuition is that the means of the densities from which we sample  will be updated 
each time the likelihood of observing the data given the parameters improves. When there is no 
improvement (d<1) the mean can still be updated but with a probability that is proportional to d.  If 
d is very low the probability that the mean is updated is also very low. We also notice that the 
improvement in the likelihood of observing the data is corrected by the odds of having sampled 
the parameters in the first place given the means of the distributions. In a symmetrical distribution 
such as the normal      , , / ,
' '
s s f f θ θ θ θ  is always equal to one. But when censoring is introduced 
in the distribution of certain parameters, which is our case, the correction is needed. 
In our application we use independent prior normal distributions for each of the parameters 
with eight different initial means – hence the final distribution is based on height independent 
sequences of sampled parameters. For the parameters risk aversion () and the time preference 
() we fix the means based on references from the literature. For preferences for consumption 
over leisure (1) and formal vs. informal sector work (2) we allow for a more or less arbitrary   16 
initial range of variation. For the parameters that determine transitions in and out of the social 
security we did some simulations to understand their influence on the steady state distribution of 
the cohort. On this basis we defined initial values and also imposed the constraint 0<1 so that 
the probability of keeping a job is always higher than the probability of finding one (which is 
consistent with the data reviewed in Section 2). Finally, for the probability of working when retired 
we used as a starting reference the average derived from the household survey.  
 For  some  of  the  parameters  the  economic  model  puts  restrictions  on  their  range  of 
variation, hence we apply left or right censoring. In all cases, judgment is involved in setting the 
variance of the distributions so that there is enough variation to explore larger regions of the 
parameter space, but not too much that it would delay convergence (see MacKay, 2003). The 
initial distributions of the model parameters for the 8 sequences are presented in Table 1.  
  
To compute the ratio d for each i we proceed as follows. First we use Cb(a,m|Md(.|,ξ),Е) 
with m=1,000 to compute the probabilities that at various ages a an individual of the cohort would 
be  in  various  states  e. We define  these  probabilities  by  p(a,e)  and  calculate  them  by  simply 
counting the number of individuals in state e at age a and then dividing by m. Then, the probability 
that the data would have been generated by  is given by the multinomial distribution: 
 
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, , ) | ( θ ,        (4) 
where Na is the number of individuals of age a who were sampled from the population, s(a,e) the 
share of these individuals that is in state e (which come from the pseudo sample), and Fa the 
number of possible combinations of individuals across states. Because we are only interested in 
likelihood ratios, the sample size is normalized to 1 so that (4) becomes the Dirichlet distribution 
with parameters s(a,e).










































 ,       (5) 
where the normalizing constants for the distributions are dropped from both the numerator and 
denominator. Then taking logs we obtain: 
                      s s
a e
s f f e a p e a p e a s d θ θ θ θ θ θ | log | log | , log | , log , log
' ' '     , (6) 
                                                 
10 The Dirichlet distribution is a Bayesian prior of the parameters of the Multinomial distribution.  It gives the 
likelihood of the probabilities p(a,e) given the shares of each cohort in each state.    17 
The only missing pieces to compute d are then probabilities of sampling the parameters 
given the means. Taking into account the left hand and right hand truncations and the variances 
of the normal distributions these probabilities are given by: 
   
   
   
   
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θ θ ,   (7) 
where N is the cumulative normal distribution, i indexes the elements of  and   is the variance 
covariance matrix of the prior distribution of the parameters that here is assumed to be a diagonal 
matrix (i.e., there are no prior correlations between the model parameters).  
 



















Mean 1  1,50  0,04  0,90  0,95  0,30  0,50 
Mean 2  1,30  0,03  0,80  0,90  0,20  0,40 
Mean 3  1,20  0,02  0,70  0,85  0,10  0,30 
Mean 4  1,10  0,01  0,60  0,80  0,05  0,20 
Mean 5  0,80  -0,01  0,70  0,85  0,05  0,20 
Mean 6  0,70  -0,03  0,70  0,85  0,01  0,20 
Mean 7  1,20  -0,02  0,80  0,85  0,10  0,30 
Mean 8  1,20  0,03  0,80  0,85  0,05  0,30 
Variance  0,05  0,01  0,05  0,05  0,05  0,05 
Trunc. left  0  -99  0,5  0  0  0 
Trunc. right  99  99  1  1  1  1 


















Mean 1  1,50  0,04  0,90  0,50  0,30  0,50 
Mean 2  1,30  0,03  0,80  0,90  0,20  0,40 
Mean 3  1,20  0,02  0,70  0,85  0,10  0,30 
Mean 4  1,10  0,01  0,60  0,80  0,05  0,20 
Mean 5  0,80  -0,01  0,70  0,45  0,05  0,20 
Mean 6  0,70  -0,03  0,70  0,85  0,01  0,20 
Mean 7  1,20  -0,02  0,80  0,45  0,10  0,30 
Mean 8  1,20  0,03  0,80  0,85  0,05  0,30 
Variance  0,05  0,01  0,05  0,05  0,05  0,05 
Trunc. left  0  -99  0,5  0  0  0 
Trunc. right  99  99  1  1  1  1 
Source:  Range of variation for Risk Aversion and Time preference parameters based Jiménez-Martín and 
Sánchez-Martín (2006).  For the other parameters see main text.   18 
To  assess  the  convergence  of  the  various  series  we  follow  the  method  proposed  in 
Gelman et al. (2000). The idea is to compare an over estimate and an under estimate of the 
posterior  marginal  variance  of  the  parameters  in    and  see  whether  they  converge.    The 
overestimate of the variance is given by the weighted sum of the between sequences (Bi) and 
within sequences (Wi) variances for each parameter i.  We have: 
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,   (9) 
where  Z  is  the  number  of  independent  sequences  and  N  the  number  of  samples  in  each 
sequence.  Both, Bi and Wi overestimate the marginal posterior variance if the initial distribution is 
appropriately over dispersed, but the estimator is unbiased when n is large (n∞).   
For a finite n, however, the within variance (Wi) should be an underestimate because the 
individual  sequences  have  not  had  yet  time  to  range  over  all  the  targeted  distribution  and 








| r a ˆ v ˆ 

 ,           (10) 
If Ri is equal or close to one the series have converged.  For applications like ours where 
we are less interested in the precision of the posterior joint distribution but care more about taking 
into account sufficient heterogeneity in behaviors, we consider values up to 1.2. 
We  applied  this  methodology  to  derive  the  posterior  distribution  for  individuals  with 
average earnings (we will refer to them as “high” income) and those with earnings equal to 50% of 
the  average  (“low”  income).  The  main  descriptive  statistics  for  each  of  the  parameters  are 
presented in  
 
Table 2. It is important to emphasize, however, that the numbers taken independently do 
not mean much. What matters are the various combinations of model parameters that make the 
joint distribution. Still, it is instructive to see that the statistics reported are consistent with our 
priors and other results in the literature.  The coefficient of risk aversion, for instance, has an   19 
average of 1.2 for both low and high income individuals, indicating that most people are risk 
averse. We also confirm negative or low levels for the average rate of time preference. For high 
income workers the median rate is 0.1% and for low income workers 0.4%.  This is consistent with 
the results in Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez-Martín (2006) showing that in the absence of social 
security individuals will tend to retire late.  The distributions also suggest stronger preferences for 
consumption over leisure for both high and low income workers.  In addition, not surprisingly, 
higher  income  workers  have  a  higher  exogenous  probability  of  formal  work  than  low  income 
workers  and  face  a  lower  disutility  of  keeping  and  finding  formal  sector  jobs.    Finally,  the 
distributions indicate that work after retirement is common, particularly for high income workers. 
Or, in other words, the model is more likely to generate predictions consistent with the aggregate 
distribution when individuals are assumed to work after retirement.    
 


















Average earnings             
Mean  1.2522  -0.0092  0.8039  0.8742  0.1003  0.4156 
Standard Error  0.0125  0.0037  0.0142  0.0077  0.0090  0.0188 
Median  1.2430  0.0013  0.8273  0.8786  0.0760  0.4400 
Minimum   1.0732  -0.0828  0.5045  0.6833  0.0040  0.0976 
Maximum  1.5405  0.0512  0.9895  0.9817  0.3224  0.7213 
50% Average Earnings             
Mean  1.2169  0.0099  0.7374  0.7529  0.1854  0.3344 
Standard Error  0.0260  0.0035  0.0158  0.0259  0.0124  0.0221 
Median  1.2106  0.0048  0.7333  0.8614  0.1791  0.3351 
Minimum   0.6345  -0.0525  0.5065  0.4284  0.0177  0.0689 
Maximum  1.5474  0.0727  0.9916  0.9821  0.3962  0.6293 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.  
 
 
In terms of the convergence statistics, we obtain for most parameters R values close to 1 
(see Table 3). The only exception is the coefficient of risk aversion. The R value of 1.4 suggests 
that further iterations with the MH algorithm would have narrowed the variance of the distribution. 
Still, as discussed above, both the current average and median of the risk aversion coefficient for 
high and low income workers are consistent with other results in the literature.    
   20 
Table 3:  Convergence Statistics for Various Parameters 
Average Earning       
Parameter  Bi  Wi  Var(θi|Y)  Ri 
Risk Aversion (λ)  4.046  0.221  0.322  1.454 
Time Pref. (ρ)  0.033  0.009  0.010  1.070 
Alfa 1 (α1)  0.493  0.142  0.151  1.065 
Prob. Formal (φ1)  0.232  0.337  0.334  0.992 
Alfa 2 (α2)  0.319  0.141  0.146  1.033 
Prob. Working (ηp)  1.515  0.156  0.191  1.230 
50% Average Earning     
Parameter  Bi  Wi  Var(θi|Y)  Ri 
Risk Aversion (λ)  2.736  0.159  0.227  1.427 
Time Pref. (ρ)  0.052  0.008  0.009  1.154 
Alfa 1 (α1)  0.310  0.126  0.130  1.039 
Prob. Formal (φ1)  1.660  0.169  0.208  1.232 
Alfa 2 (α2)  0.140  0.155  0.154  0.998 
Prob. Working (ηp)  0.816  0.124  0.143  1.146 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
5  Dynamics under the Status-quo  
 
For each income level (“high” and “low”) we run the model “across” the joint distribution of 
parameters focusing on three outcomes: the probability that an individual is contributing to the 
social security at a given age, the probability that the individual is retired at a given age, and 
assets accumulations by age 55. 
  The results regarding the probability of contributing to the social security or being retired 
at a given age are summarized in Figure 5.  Each line refers to one point of the joint distribution of 
model parameters. As in the estimation, the probabilities are computed based on 1,000 runs of 
the model. The figure shows that, under the status-quo, on average, around 30-35 percent of the 
high-income workers and 45-50 percent of the low income would be outside of the formal sector 
between ages 35 and 45. Afterwards, the probability of formal sector work declines for both high 
and low earners. This is consistent with the current distribution of age cohorts as discussed in 
Section 4. Thus, for several sets of preferences, we find the pattern of a declining probability of 
formal work with age which is found in the empirical analysis of labor market transitions over the 
life-cycle (see Perry et al. 2007; and Robalino et al., 2009). The standard interpretation is that, 
with age, workers gain experience and easier access to credit, and that many then prefer to 
switch to self-employment.  In our model we do not formalize experience (other than through the 
real growth rate of wages) and individuals are not allowed to borrow. The interpretation instead is 
that individuals will have the motivation to move out of formal sector jobs as they get older. In   21 
essence, the “marginal utility” of formal jobs relative to informal jobs goes down with time – while 
the marginal disutility linked to the effort invested in finding and keeping jobs remains constant 
(given the shape of the utility function). The main reasons for this are higher consumption levels 
and higher asset accumulations. In our setting, therefore, it becomes optimal to reduce efforts in 
finding/keeping formal sector jobs. 
In terms of retirement, the model predicts that around half of the high earners would retire 
between  ages  55  and  60.  Low  income  individuals,  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  retire  later  – 
between ages 60 and 65. This is also consistent with the analysis of cohorts presented in Section 
4  and  the  micro-data  analyzed  in  World  Bank  (2008).  But  again,  the  variation  in  retirement 
patterns  can  be  considerable.  Some  individuals  can  retire  as  early  as  53,  others  can  delay 
retirement until 70 (see bottom two panels of Figure 5).   
Figure 5:  Probabilities of Contributing to INSS and Retiring 





























































































































































Note:  The dark lines with dots give the “average” path for the cohort. 
Source:  Simulation model. 
 
Overall,  the  results  emphasize  the  significance  that  individual  preferences  have  in 
determining behaviors – and therefore the impact of alternative policies. It is thus important to 
understand what is the marginal effect that various parameters have on outcome variables of 
interest, in this case contribution densities and retirement ages. To do this we estimated stepwise   22 
regressions  of  these  two  variables  on  the  six  model  parameters,  their  squares,  and  their 
interactions (15 regressors in total). For the estimation we used the entire joint distribution of 
model parameters which has around 550 points.      
The  results  are  summarized  in  Annex  3  and  show,  not  surprisingly,  that  the  model 
parameters affect the endogenous variables through complex interactions. The resulting linear 
approximations  (or  second  order  expansions)  of  the  structural  model  differ  for  low  and  high 
income workers – which is consistent with the fact that the social security system affects low and 
high income workers differently. But the sign of the partial derivatives of the endogenous variables 
with respect to each of the parameters is the same for both high and low income workers. In all 
cases, the signs are consistent theoretically and intuitively (see Figure 6). 
In terms of contribution densities,  the parameters  that have a positive effect are:  the 
coefficient  of  risk  aversion  (more  risk  adverse  individuals  demand  more  insurance),  the 
preference for consumption over leisure (preference towards consumption provides incentives to 
increase earnings through formal sector work), and the exogenous probability of formal sector 
work (other things being equal the higher this probability the higher the contribution density). On 
the other hand, the parameters that reduce contribution densities are:  the rate of time preference 
(the more individuals discount the future the less willing they are to invest in long term savings), 
the disutility of efforts to find/keep formal sector jobs (other things being equal, the higher the 
disutility  the  least  effort  individuals  invest  in  joining/staying  in  the  social  security),  and  the 
probability of working when retired (the higher the expected value of this source of income the 
lower the incentives to contribute for pensions).   
  Regarding retirement ages, the parameters that have a positive impact are the coefficient 
of risk aversion (more risk adverse individuals prefer to increase earnings and savings and delay 
retirement),  and  preferences  over  consumption  (which  also  provide  incentives  to  increase 
earnings  and  delay  retirement).  All  the  other  parameters  have  a  negative  effect.  The  more 
individuals discount the future the less willing they are to differ cashing-up their pensions; the 
higher the probability of formal work the sooner the individual can meet eligibility conditions for a 
pension (and would also have accumulated higher savings); the higher the disutility of formal 
sector work the lower the incentives individuals have to keep working; and, finally, the higher the 
probability of working while retired the lower the forgone revenues from retirement.       
   23 
Figure 6:  Partial Derivatives in Second Order Expansion of the Structural Model 
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Source:  Simulation model. 
 
The simulations also predict average asset accumulations by age 55.  For those with 
earnings equal to the average the present value of assets accumulated by age 55 is equivalent, 
on average, to 90 percent of initial yearly earnings.  For those with earnings equal to 50 percent of 
the average, accumulations represent, on average, 45 percent of initial yearly earnings.
11 These 
predictions have not been compared with real data but the order of magnitude is not disparate. In 
general, the results suggest low levels of savings. But savings also vary considerably depending 
on preferences (see Figure 7). Among average earners, the individual who saves the least would 
have assets worth, in present value, less than three months of initial earnings, while the individual 
who saves the most would have savings representing 6 times initial yearly earnings. The lowest 
and highest level of savings among low income workers are respectively one month and 4.5 years 
of earnings. We did not estimate a linear model to look at the marginal effect of each parameter 
on savings rates but simple correlations show that the main parameters influencing savings are 
the coefficient of risk aversion and preferences for consumption over leisure. In the rest of the 
analysis, however, the focus will be on contribution densities and retirement ages.   
                                                 
11 These assets exclude the pension wealth from the mandatory system but include accumulations in the FGTS 
program.   24 
Figure 7:  Individual Preferences and Assets Accumulations 



































































































































































































Source:  Simulation model. 
 
 
6  Potential Impact of Policy Changes 
 
We start by looking at the marginal impact of each of the programs on retirement ages and 
contribution densities “across” the joint distribution of parameters. We basically ask the question 
what would be the impact on the output variables of interest of removing, one at the time, the 
pension  system,  the  unemployment  insurance  system,  and  the  unemployment  FGTS  savings 
accounts. We then look at the effect of policy interventions that aim to separate the insurance and 
redistributive functions in the pensions system. This is done by having one single formula for 
pensions that is “incentives neutral” and then using various forms of explicit subsidies to finance 
transfers for targeted individuals.   
A  general,  and  important,  message  from  the  analysis  is  that,  like  in  the  case  of  the 
baseline,  the  effects  of  any  policy  intervention  on  behaviors  are  very  sensitive  to  individual 
preferences. One could compute an average effect for each intervention, for instance, an average 
increase or reduction in contribution densities and retirement ages. But this average effect would 
hide considerable variation resulting from unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. Thus, in what 
follows  we  look  at  the  impact  of  policy  changes  on  a  sub-region  of  the  parameters  space, 
basically the 35 points with the highest likelihood or the “center” of the joint distribution. We limited 
ourselves to 35 points mainly given constraints in terms of computing time. 
We first remove the pension system. The effects on contribution densities
12 and retirement 
ages are quite different for high and low income workers. For high income workers we observe, in 
                                                 
12 Although there is no more pension system and, therefore, no more individual contributions, we still consider formal 
work to be contributory, because of the taxes paid to finance UI and the FGTS contribution paid by the employer.   25 
most cases, a reduction in retirement ages and an increase in contributions densities (see top left 
panel  in  Figure  8).  Basically,  the  pension  system  as  it  is  provides  incentives  to  high  income 
workers to delay retirement but reduces incentives for formal work. In Section 2 we had already 
pointed out that the Brazilian pension system pays implicit rates of return (IRR) on contributions 
above market and that the IRR goes up with the retirement age. Hence, it is not surprising to see 
retirement ages going down when the pension system is eliminated. At the same time, the higher 
rates of return on contributions have an income effect that allows workers to contribute less (and 
in fact save less) for retirement. Thus, when the pension system is eliminated we do observe 
people spending more time in the formal sector and saving more (see bottom panel in Figure 8).    
For low income workers there is more variation in the behavioral response.  In around 1/3 
of the cases retirement ages increase and contribution densities fall. In a few cases the opposite 
occurs  and,  for  the  majority,  contribution  densities  remain  more  or  less  unchanged  while 
retirement ages fall (see top right panel of Figure 8). To interpret these results it is useful to think 
about individuals having natural retirement ages and contribution densities – those that would be 
observed without the pension system. As we showed in the previous section, there would be a 
large variation in these retirement ages as a function of individual preferences. A first group of 
individuals would naturally opt to retire late and participate less in formal sector work (as shown in 
Section 2 less formal work is correlated with delayed retirement). But because of the pension 
system  and  its  implicit  (the  high  IRR)  and  explicit  subsidies  (the  minimum  pension),  these 
individuals can afford to advance retirement. At the same time, to be eligible for the minimum 
pension guarantee, they are willing to put more effort into finding/keeping formal sector  jobs.  
Thus, in the simulations, when the pension system is eliminated, these individual (preferences) 
appear in the north east quadrant of the figure:  they delay retirement and participate less in 
formal sector work. 
A second group of individuals tends to retire early, in part for instance, as a result of a 
higher exogenous probability of finding/keeping formal sector jobs where earnings are higher.  
Hence, they also have higher contribution densities.  Because of the pension system, however, 
they have an incentive to delay retirement to benefit from the minimum pension guarantee. They 
can also afford to reduce contribution densities (which are “naturally high”) since higher vesting 
periods will not imply higher pensions (due to the 100 effective marginal tax rate discussed in 
Section 2). When in the simulations the pension system is eliminated, these individuals appear in 
the  south-east  quadrant:  they  reduce  retirement  ages  (since  there  is  no  longer  a  minimum 
pension as an incentive) and they increase contribution densities.       26 
Figure 8:  Effects of Removing the Pension System 
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Source:  Simulation model. 
 
Finally, in the largest group, there are individuals for whom the pension system provides 
incentives to delay retirement (because of eligibility for the minimum pension) but who do not 
have high contribution densities (for instance given a high probability of work during retirement or 
a high disutility of formal sector work) and thus do not reduce them (otherwise they would not 
meet the eligibility conditions). When the pension system is removed these individuals appear 
within the ellipse of the chart: they reduce retirement ages but leave contribution densities more or 
less unchanged. 
 
 Regarding  the  unemployment  insurance  system  there  are  two  effects  that  one  could 
expect.  For  some  workers  removing  UI  would  provide  more  incentives  to  self-insure  –  which 
implies  spending  more time  in  the formal  sector  and  saving  more.  For  others,  eliminating  UI 
implies  loosing  implicit  subsidies  that  are financed  entirely  by  the  employer  and  this  reduces 
incentives to enroll in the social security. For high income workers the first effect dominates – 
there is only one case where the contribution density falls which is associated with a high disutility 
of formal employment. When loosing UI these workers contribute more and then can also afford to 
retire earlier. For low income workers in half of the cases the same phenomenon is observed and 
contribution densities increase. In the other half of the cases, however, contribution densities 
decrease. These cases are characterized by a high disutility of formal work, a high discount rate, 
and a high probability of work during retirement. And indeed, as discussed in the previous section, 
the  first  two  parameters  tend  to  have  higher  values  among  low  income  workers.  For  these 
individuals eliminating UI reduces the incentives they have to engage in formal sector work which 
is naturally costly.     27 
Figure 9:  Effects of Removing the Unemployment Insurance System 
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Source:  Simulation model. 
 
The effects of FGTS also differ for high and low income workers. For high income workers 
the main effect is a reduction in contribution densities without a meaningful change in retirement 
ages  (see  left  panel  of  Figure  10).  Lower  contribution  densities  are  not  surprising.  Indeed, 
eliminating the program reduces a substantial share of subsidized savings – since contributions 
are paid by the employer – and therefore incentives to contribute to the social security.
13  We also 
notice, however, that there is a group of high income individuals for whom contribution densities 
do  not  change.  The  main  interpretation  is  that  contribution  densities  for  them  are  “binding;” 
reducing them further would make them ineligibility for the highest pension at a given retirement 
age.     
For  low  income  workers  we  also  observe  a  set  of  preferences  for  which  a  drop  in 
contribution densities occurs without meaningful changes in the retirement age – with or without 
FGTS they most likely retire late. A majority of individuals, however, choose to retire earlier when 
FGTS is eliminated (see right panel of Figure 10) without changing much contribution densities.  
The interpretation is that when loosing FGTS these individuals have fewer incentives to delay 
retirement and continue benefiting from subsidized savings. Clearly, the additional savings from 
FGTS can also allow some workers to retire earlier, but the first effect in this case dominates.          
 
                                                 
13 Clearly, FGTS can also induce fake dismissals and promote informal sector work as workers tend to cash savings.  
But this does not imply reducing the contribution density.  Hence, higher contribution densities can co-exist with a 
higher turn over rate (which given the long-term nature of our model we have not computed).   28 
Figure 10:  Effects of Removing FGTS 
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Source:  Simulation model. 
 
Next we look at the effects of possible reforms that introduce “incentive neutral” benefit 
formulas in the pension system and make redistribution explicit and targeted to individuals with 
limited savings capacity. The policy changes that we simulate are summarized in Table 4. The 
common feature, in all cases, is that the benefit formulas for pensions are unified into one given 
by:  





















,       (11) 
where pR is the pension paid by the system at retirement age R; βw, βe, and βg are the contribution 
rates paid to the system respectively by the employee, the employer and the government (when 
there are explicit subsidies); a is the age when the individual joins the system, irr is the rate of 
return that the system pays on contributions; and GR(irr) is an annuity factor that also depends on 
irr. In our application, irr is assumed to be equal to the growth rate of the average wage, which as 
shown in Robalino and Bodor (2008) is a good proxy to the sustainable internal rate of return of a 
pay-as-you-go system (although in most cases this proxy would be below the sustainable rate).   
In terms of contribution rates, we assume that employees pay 8% (equal to the minimum 
contribution  rate  today)  and  that  out  of  the  20  percentage  points  paid  by  the  employer,  8 
percentage points are allocated to finance old-age pensions. Thus the total contribution rate to 
finance pensions is 16%. 
   29 
Table 4:  Summary of Policy Interventions 
REFORMS  DESCRIPTION 
Reform 1 
Pensions  benefit  formulas  are  unified.    Eligibility  age  for 
pension is fixed at age 55.  There is no vesting period and 
no  minimum  pension  guarantee.    No  changes  in  UI  and 
FGTS. 
Reform 2 
Like Reform 1 but a minimum pension guarantee equal to 
42% of economy wide average earnings is offered at age 55 
as a top-up (100% marginal tax). 
Reform 3  Like Reform 2 but the minimum pension guarantee is only 
offered at age 65.  
Reform 4  Like Reform 3 but the minimum pension is offered as a flat 
rate (0% marginal tax). 
Reform 5 
Like Reform 1 but a matching contribution equivalent to 75% 
of  the  total  contribution  is  offered  and  financed  by  the 
government. Two retirement ages are explored:  55 and 65.  
Reform 6 
Like Reform 5 but the matching contribution is equivalent to 
2.25 times the total contribution.  Two retirement ages are 
also explored:  55 and 65. 
Source:  Authors. 
 
We first analyze the case where the pension formula is unified, the eligibility age becomes 
55, the vesting period is eliminated, and there is no minimum pension (see Figure 11).  This 
scenario tells us what would happen in a pension system that is actuarially fair (and financially 
sustainable)   and where there are no restrictions on retirement.     
We observe that for the average earner the results are similar  to the case where the 
pension  system  is  eliminated.  In  essence,  relative  to  the  status-quo,  these  individuals  lose 
subsidies to retire late.  Their optimal reaction is therefore to reduce retirement ages and increase 
contribution densities (and savings). Relative to the case with no pension system (Figure 8) there 
is a small increase in contribution densities and retirement ages. Basically, for average earners, 
adding an actuarially fair pension system where the employer matches the contribution rate can 
increase marginally the time individuals spend in formal sector work. And, in most cases, there 
are no major impacts on the retirement age, although one can observe a few cases where the 
retirement age increases (waiting to retire increases the value of the pension) and others where it 
decreases (pensions allow individuals to retire early).
14 
  For low income workers the results relative to the status-quo are also similar to the case 
with no pension system: retirement ages and contribution densities can increase or decrease 
depending on individual preferences. When we compare the results to the case without pension 
system we also see that retirement ages and contribution densities can go up or down.  The 
                                                 
14 Although not shown, in most cases, the actuarially fair pension system with a matching contribution from employers 
would decrease savings.   30 
matching from the employer provides more incentives to contribute and can increase contribution 
densities. Higher contribution densities then can allow workers to afford earlier retirement. At the 
same time, the matching implies that workers need to save less to finance a given pension at a 
given retirement age. Thus, contribution densities can decrease while retirement ages increase. 
        
Figure 11:  Reform 1 - Minimum Retirement at 55 - No Minimum Pension 
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Note:  Comparisons are relative to baseline 
Source:  Simulation model. 
 
 
Next we add a minimum pension guarantee offered as a top-up (i.e., 100 percent claw 
back rate) that is available starting age 55 (Reform 2).  We see that for average earners there are 
no major changes. This is because these workers are less likely to benefit from the minimum 
pension  in  the  first  place.  For  low  income  workers,  however,  the  minimum  pension  reduces 
substantially retirement ages and contribution densities. Indeed, workers can now contribute less, 
become eligible for a minimum pension and thus be able to replace a substantial part of their 
earnings  at  early  ages.  The  effect  of  the  minimum  pension  on  the  retirement  age  has  been 
previously  discussed  in  Bodor  et  al.  (2008)  and  Jiménez-Martin  and  Sánchez-Martin  (2006).  
These new results, in addition, emphasize the negative effect that the minimum pension can have 
on the time that workers spend in the formal sector.  Indeed, simulated reductions in contribution 
densities are considerable, ranging between 10 and 30 percentage points.   
        31 
Figure 12:  Reform 2 - Minimum Pension at Age 55 
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Note:  Comparisons are relative to baseline 
Source:  Simulation model. 
 
The next simulation increases the eligibility age for the minimum pension to 65 (Reform 3).  
Again, there are no major changes for average earners – except that a few might delay retirement 
and reduce contribution densities thus becoming eligible for the minimum pension.  Among low 
income workers, on the other hand, the effects are large. First, not surprisingly,  the minimum 
pension at age 65 creates strong incentives to delay retirement and the majority of workers do.  
Contribution densities also decrease in all cases but most of the time the effect is small – less 
than 5 percentage points. In fact, there is a very strong negative correlation (-0.9) between the 
increase in the contribution density and the increase in the retirement age. Those individuals who 
delay retirement until age 65 leave unchanged or increase little the contribution density (i.e., lower 
pension  wealth  from  the  minimum  pension  provides  some  incentives  to  earn  more  and  save 
more). On the other hand, those workers who do not increase retirement ages (mainly because 
retirement  ages  are  already  high)  “accommodate”  the  subsidies  by  reducing  contribution 
densities.     
Figure 13:  Reform 3 – Minimum Pension at 65  
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Note:  Comparisons are relative to baseline 
Source:  Simulation model.   32 
 
We also look at the effects of the claw back rates which are usually introduced to improve 
incentives to contribute (Reform 4). As discussed in Section 2, the issue is that in the case of a 
minimum pension offered as a top-up (100% claw back) each unit increase in the contributory 
pension is offset by a one unit decrease in the minimum pension guarantee: there is a 100% 
marginal tax on the contributory pension. This reduces incentives to contribute beyond a minimum 
necessary to be eligible for the minimum pension. In theory, other things being equal, reducing 
the  claw-back  rate  can increase  contribution  densities  (see  Valdez-Prieto,  2008;  Piggot  et  al. 
(2009)). This assumes, however, that there are no other costs involved in taking formal sector 
jobs (or other benefits from informal sector jobs). When this is not the case, the income effect 
resulting  from  the  reduction  in  the  marginal  tax  can  actually  reduce  contribution  densities.  
Basically, some individuals would be able to “afford” reducing efforts and spending less time in the 
formal sector, having lower earnings, and lower savings.   
To test these two possible cases we simulate the impact of moving from a 100% claw 
back rate to a 0% claw back rate. In essence, we are moving from a top-up to a flat pension – 
where  in  theory  individuals  would  not  mind  contributing  more  since  they  would  not  lose  the 
minimum pension. The results show that in the case of average earners contribution densities 
would  actually  decrease  (although  the  changes  are  small,  below  5  percentage  points)  while 
retirement  ages  increase  (see  left  bottom  panel  of  Figure  14).  Basically,  individuals  have 
incentives to delay retirement and benefits from the flat pension. At the same time, the increase in 
pension  wealth  allows  them  to  reduce  efforts  to  find  and  keep  formal  sector  jobs.  Thus,  the 
correlation between changes in contribution densities and the changes in retirement ages is -0.87. 
For low income individuals the situation is different. Despite the transfer, they are still 
better off by contributing the same or a bit more and increasing the contributory pension -- and the 
0% marginal tax provides some incentives to do so. Thus, in most cases, contribution densities 
increase,  albeit  by  not  much  (less  than  2  percentage  points).  The  few  exceptions  where 
contribution densities go down involve individuals with a high probability of finding formal sector 
jobs. They have higher contribution densities to start with. The income effect from the flat pension 
then allows them to reduce efforts somewhat and spend less time in formal sector jobs, although 
the effects are also small (less than 3 percentage points).              
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Figure 14:  Reform 4 - Minimum Pension at Age 65 with Claw Back Rate of 0% 
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Note:  Comparison is relative to Reform 3 (minimum pension at age 65 with claw-back rate of 100%).. 
Source:  Simulation model. 
 
 
Our next simulations look at the effect of matching contributions (Reforms 5 and 6) which 
have been suggested as a promising instrument  to expand pension coverage to the informal 
sector (see Palacios and Robalino, 2009). In essence, the program involves matching part of the 
contributions made by employees (and in this case the employer) as an incentive to promote 
enrollment  and  contributions,  and  thus  help  finance  an  adequate  pension  at  retirement  for 
individuals with low savings capacity.   
In our example we look at two matching levels:  75% (Reform 5) and 225% (Reform 6).  In 
both cases we allow for two retirement ages, minimum 55 and minimum 65. The analysis is only 
applied to low income workers. Most high income workers here are not eligible for the minimum 
pension guarantee and therefore would not be eligible for matching contributions either. 
  The  results  are  summarized  in  Figure  15.  The  two  panels  give  the  changes  in 
contribution densities and retirement ages for the two matching levels relative to the case of the 
minimum pension guarantee at age 65 (Reform 3). In the figures the circles correspond to the 
case with a minimum retirement age at 55 and the squares to the case with a minimum retirement 
of 65 years.  In the second panel we have also included a case where individuals can retire after 
age 55 but before age 65, as long as they have a pension that is above or equal to the minimum 
pension (see triangles). 
We  observe  that  in  all  cases  the  matching  increases  contribution  densities.  The  most 
significant  effects,  however,  are  seen  when  there  are  no  restrictions  on  the  retirement  age.  
Contribution  densities  in  that  case  can  increase,  on  average,  by  up  to  30  percentage  points 
depending on preferences. The tradeoff, however, is a reduction in the retirement age that can 
decline by up to 10 years. In essence, individuals who before delayed retirement to benefit from 
the minimum pension offered at age 65 now are able to retire early and benefit from the matching.    34 
This tradeoff had already been discusses above: other things being equal, when individuals delay 
retirement, they often can afford to contribute less to the pension system and vice versa.   
One policy implication would be that, within a strategy to expand coverage and promote 
formality, matching contributions can play a role as long as individuals are allowed to decide when 
to  retire.  As  long  as  the  pension  system  is  actuarially  fair  and  there  is  a  maximum  level  of 
matching, this would not threaten the financial sustainability of the system. Imposing restrictions 
on the retirement age and, in particular, setting a high retirement age would reduce incentives to 
contribute and participate in the social security.   
Unfortunately, not imposing a higher minimum retirement age and not having a minimum 
pension can result in pension values that are too low relative to earnings. The alternative then is 
to set a retirement restriction that is based on the value of the pension. For instance, individuals 
could retire at any age below a minimum (e.g., age 65) but only if the pension they receive is 
equal or above the minimum pension. The triangles in the second panel of Figure 15 show that 
under this policy contribution densities increase more than when individuals are simply forced to 
retire at age 65, although less than when the minimum retirement age is set at 55.  At the same 
time, there are fewer incentives to reduce retirement ages.     
Still, even with restrictions in the value of the pension necessary to retire, many individuals 
are likely to end up with pensions that are too low. This can be seen in Figure 16 which graphs 
the average replacement rate received by individuals with different preferences as a function of 
the costs. The various markers in the figure refer to alternative policies. We see, for instance, that 
in the case of the three policies that offer a matching of 225% (at age 65, at age 55, and before 
age 65 if the pension is above the minimum) many workers retire with a pension that represents 
less than 84 percent of pre-retirement earnings (meaning below the minimum pension which is 
equal to 42 percent of average earnings). In essence, although workers have higher contribution 
densities, these are often not enough to finance the current value of the minimum pension. Even 
in the case of matching contributions with a restriction in the value of the pension before age 65 
(see triangles) individuals can end up with pensions below the minimum.   
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Figure 15:  Reforms 5 & 6 – Effects of Matching Contributions 
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Note:  Comparison is relative to Reform 3 (minimum pension at age 65 with claw-back rate of 100%). 
Source:  Simulation model. 
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Source:  Simulation model. 
 
At the same time, in the majority of cases, the cost of matching contributions is lower than 
the cost of the minimum pension (i.e., for a given level of the replacement rate costs are lower for 
the matching
15). Indeed, in the case of the two minimum pensions graphed (42 and 25 percent of 
average earnings) the majority of workers retire with a pension at least equal to the minimum 
(there are a few exceptions of workers retiring before age 65 with no minimum pension), but this 
means that the pension system needs to subsidize a large part of the total pension received. The 
subsidy is by definition larger than in the case of matching contributions since workers contribute 
less (i.e., have lower contribution densities). 
                                                 
15 The exception is the case with matching and no restriction in the minimum age since individuals can receive a given 
replacement rate at an early age.     36 
It  is  also  important  to  note  that  while  matching  contributions  may  fail  to  bring  most 
individuals to retire with,  effectively, a replacement rate equal to 84 percent of pre-retirement 
earnings  (or  42  percent  of  the  average  wage)  it  can  bring  many  workers  to  retire  with  a 
replacement  rate  of  50  percent  (or  25  percent  of  the  average).  And  replacement  rates  with 
matching  are  considerably  higher  than  replacement  rates  without  matching  (the  maximum 
replacement  rate  without  matching  is  represented  in  the  figure  by  the  dotted  horizontal  line).  
Hence,  the  effectiveness  of  matching  contributions  also  depends  on  the  policy  objective.  By 
international standards a minimum pension equal to 42 percent of average earnings is high (see 
Whitehouse,  2007).  A  25  percent  target  would  be  more  affordable  and  could  be  more  easily 
achievable through matching contributions. Or, one could think of a system where the minimum is 
25 percent but where individuals who contribute more can still finance higher pensions without 
losing the subsidies (which is the case that is being illustrated here). 
This being said, there is still the problem of those individuals who, despite the incentives, 
do not contribute enough and end up with very low pensions (e.g., below 25 percent of average 
earnings). The solution in this case, we argue, would be to offer a transfer to those individuals 
with a consumption level below a certain minimum – this minimum in fact would apply regardless 
of age. It would be an anti-poverty means-tested transfer and the test would involve consumption 
(or total earnings) not simply pension income. Simulations, not presented here, show that a flat 
transfer equal or below 20 percent of average earnings for those individuals whose consumption 
fall below that level would not have significant effects on behaviors.     
 
6  Conclusions 
 
  This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  both  in terms  of  analytical  methods  and  policy 
analysis. On methods, we solved and estimated an inter-temporal behavioral model that can be 
used to analyze how changes in the rules of pensions and unemployment benefits systems affect 
contribution densities (that is decisions to participate in the social security), savings, retirement 
ages,  and  program  costs.  This  type  of  model  can  be  a  complement  to  the  standard  non-
behavioral models used traditionally in the analysis of pensions and unemployment insurance 
reforms.   
We also developed a Bayesian methodology to estimate the joint distribution of model 
parameters based on a generalized version of the Gibbs sampler -- the so called Metropolis-
Hastings  (MH)  algorithm.  In  our  application  the  estimation  used  as  the  target  the  distribution   37 
across four states (contributing to the social security, out of the social security, unemployed, or 
retired) of a representative cohort of males living in urban areas in Brazil.      
In terms of policy analysis our application of the model to Brazil provides several insights 
about the reform of pensions and income protection systems.   
First  we  find  that  there  are  important  interactions  between  the  pension  system,  the 
unemployment insurance system, and the FGTS (the system of individual unemployment savings 
accounts).  Changes  in  the  unemployment  insurance  system,  for  instance,  affect  contribution 
densities that in turn affect retirement ages, pension levels and therefore the costs of the pension 
system. Similarly, changes in FGTS and the pension system affect the performance of the UI 
system. The main implication is that the design and implementation of reforms across these two 
programs should be coordinated. 
Regarding  incentives  we  find  that  the  current  programs  affect  savings,  contribution 
densities,  and  retirement  ages  through  complex  interactions.  Effects  are  very  sensitive  to 
individual preferences and income levels. In general, it is questionable whether the calculation of 
an  “average  effect”  (say  in  retirement  ages  or  contribution  densities)  for  a  given  change  in 
program rules is sufficient to inform policy. Indeed, this average effect would hide considerable 
variation  related  to  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  preferences.  Thus,  we  have  focused  on  the 
analysis of policy impacts across the distribution of model parameters. 
  Globally,  the  results  show  that  the  pension  system  provides  incentives  to  delay 
retirement for both high and income workers. It also reduces the contribution densities of high 
income workers and can increase of decrease the contribution density of low income workers.  
The unemployment insurance system also increases retirement ages, reduces the contribution 
densities of high income workers and can increase or decrease the contribution densities of low 
income workers. Finally, FGTS has little effect on the retirement ages of high income workers but 
increases  the  retirement  ages  of  low  income  workers. In  both  cases  it  increases  contribution 
densities.   
The results also support the idea that financial sustainability and efficiency in the Brazilian 
social insurance system could improve by making redistribution more explicit and transparent.  In 
the  case  of  pensions  this  would  imply  adopting  a  single  actuarially  fair  formula  that  links 
contribution to benefits (without the need to move to a funded scheme) and is “incentives neutral.”  
Targeted  retirement  income  transfers  would  then  be  used  to  provide  incentives  to  enroll  and 
contribute to low income workers and to top-up their benefits. To this end, matching contributions 
combined with anti-poverty transfers appear as a better option than the current minimum pension 
guarantee. Indeed, matching contributions provide better incentives to contribute and are less   38 
costly. A similar reform could be considered for the income protection system. The idea there is to 
unify the unemployment insurance system and FGTS.  The core of the unemployment benefits 
would come from FGTS (again minimizing distortions), while the UI component (and part of the 
dismissal tax) would be used to finance explicit redistribution within the system (i.e., to top up the 
benefits of low income individuals).     
There  are,  of  course,  limitations  to  the  analysis.  First,  the  model  remains  a  simplified 
representation of reality. While it can reproduce the distribution of a given cohort across states, 
there is no guarantee that it is a fair representation of how individuals react to change (even if 
their preferences remain the same). For instance, as Prospect Theory tells us, individuals might 
react differently to gains than to losses.  We have addressed this by looking at a broad range of 
possible behavioral responses, but still the results should be interpreted with caution.   
The second limitation is that we work in a partial-equilibrium framework. Several of the 
reforms discussed here are likely to affect the demand for labor and equilibrium wages and this 
would influence the steady-state impact of the proposed reforms.   
Third, given the considerable demands on computing time, we have not been able to look 
at the pensions and unemployment insurance systems in their totality, and have focused instead 
on a single age-gender cohort and two income levels. The net effect of the reforms and their costs 
would  of  course  depend  on  the  distribution  of  individuals  by  income  groups.  Moreover,  other 
individual  characteristics  (e.g.,  education)  are  likely  to  be  relevant  in  determining  individual 
preferences and therefore behavioral change. We also know that our estimates of the posterior 
joint distribution of model parameters could be improved if working with individual records instead 
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Annex 1:  Benefit Formulas in the Pensions and UI Systems 
 
Pensions 
The proportional Length of Contribution Pension is Given by: 
    54 * 05 . 0 1 ,
70 . 0
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100
* 31 . 0
1
) (












where  R  is  the  retirement  age,  v  the  vesting  period,  G(R)  life  expectancy  at  age  R,  and 
LifeTimeWage is the average of all salaries indexed by inflation. 
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The aging pension is:   
  ge LifeTimeWa v pR * * 01 . 0 7 . 0    
 
Unemployment Insurance 
The value of monthly UI benefits varies from R$380 (the Brazilian Minimum Wage) to R$710.97, 
depending on the average wage computed in the last three-month period of work.  Values are 
depicted in the table below. 
 
 
Monthly wage range  UI benefit 
Up to R$627.29  0.8 * average monthly wage 
Minimum value = 1 Minimum Wage (R$380.00) 
R$627.30 to R$1,045.58  R$501,83 + 0.5 * value exceeding R$627.29 
Maximum value = R$710.97 
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Annex 2:  Moving from Cross-Sectional to Longitudinal Cohorts 
 
The main source of information used in this paper are the microdata from the Pesquisa Nacional 
por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) –National Household Sample Survey.  This survey is goes to 
the field each year (except the years of the Census) and is managed by the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia  e  Estatística  (IBGE)  -  Brazilian  Institute  of  Geography  and  Statistics.  It  is  a 
comprehensive research on socio-economic characteristics of the population and households in 
Brazil. The issues include topics such as income, occupations, social security, education, fertility, 
etc.  Each year are interviewed around 0.25% of the Brazilian population, which corresponds to 
just over 420,000 records.  For this exercise we used the PNADs for years 1990, 1996, 2001, and 
2006.  In addition, we relied on aggregate data from the Statistical Yearbook of Social Security, 
published yearly by the Ministry of Social Security. 
For the analysis the population was divided in the following groups: 
a)  Workers  "with  carteira."  This  group  includes  all  individuals  that  work  in  the  formal  private 
sector.  Or, for the purposes of this paper, which contribute to the social security system.  Thus, 
civil servants and military are excluded from our analysis 
b) Workers "without carteira." This group includes all workers who are in the informal sector.  Or, 
for the purposes of this paper, which do not contribute to the basic social security system. 
c) Unemployed.  This group included all unemployed individuals.  It means they are not working 
they are looking for a job. 
d) Retired workers.  This group includes all who receive old-age benefits and are not in the labor 
market.  This caveat is important, because in Brazil a worker can retire, receive their benefit and 
continue working, without any changes, either in his situation in the labor market, either in his 
situation as beneficiary. 
People were then divided by cohorts of 5 years, according to the following division:  16-20 years; 
21-25 years;…; 66-70; and 71+.  All persons under the age of 16 years were excluded from the 
dataset because that is the legal age of initiation of work and contribution to social security.   
The  main  complication  at  this  stage  was  with  the  retirees.    The  PNAD  does  not  provide 
information on whether the person receives his retirement from the Regime Geral de Previdência 
Social (RGPS) - General Social Security System or the National Social Security Institute (i.e., if 
the person is a retiree from the private or public sector).  To this end, the data from the survey 
was matched to the data from the Anuário Estatístico de Previdência Social (AEPS) - Statistical 
Yearbook of Social Security, which contains retirees by sector and age groups.  Given that the 
age groups are not the same some additional adjustments were necessary.  As the age-cohorts 
made by AEPS start from an age x and our cohorts from an age x + 1, the two information have 
only 4 years in common (80% of data).  Thus, we built a new cohort x’, composed of 0.8 * (similar 
cohort of AEPS) + 0.2 * (previous cohort of AEPS).   
 
Moving from cross-sectional to longitudinal cohorts 
With the pseudo-panel formed by the PNADs it is possible to describe the behavior along the life 
cycle of a few cohorts.  For example, the cohort aged x in 2006 was x-5 years old in 2001, x-10 
years old in 1996 and so on.  But the question we want to answer is: what will happen with that 
cohort  in  5  years  from  now?  And  in  n  years  from  now?    This  means  trying  to  predict  the 
percentage of individuals of that cohort that will be in each of the four groups that defined above in 
the next n years.  We considered two methods.   43 
Method 1.  The assumption here is that the behavior of a given cohort will be similar to what 
happened with individuals of other cohorts, (that can be observed in other PNADs), when they 
were the same age.  For example, in 2006 a given percentage of individuals aged x were in the 
formal sector. In 2011, this cohort will be 5 years older.  We postulate that the percentage of 
individuals  from  the  cohort  who  would  be  in  the  informal  sector  is  a  weighted  average  of 
percentages found for the cohort aged x +n in the previous PNADs.  The weighting gives greater 
importance to more recent years.  For each cohort and for each group, the procedure is repeated.  
So we have: 
d c b a
PCT d PCT c PCT b PCT a
PCT
j i x j i x j i x j i x
j i x   
  

    21 , , 15 , , 10 , , 5 , ,
, ,
* * * *
 
where PCTxij is the percentage of people who was in the group i, aged x, in the year j.  The terms 
a, b, c and d represent the weights of each year in the equation. 
 
Method 2.  In this case, for each cohort, we estimate the relationship between the percentages of 
individuals in each group found in each pair of consecutive PNADs.  For instance, in the first 
PNAD there is a given percentage for people aged x that is in category y.  In the following PNAD, 
we take into account the age group x +n (i.e., the same cohort) and look at the percentage still in 
category y.  We compute the growth rate RG:  









After this, we calculated the mean rates for going from age x to age x+5 for every category.  We 
used these means to input values for the distribution of the cohorts in the years when we do not 
observe them.  The results for each group are normalized in such a way that the sum of the four 
groups is always 100. 
Methods 1 and 2 give similar results for workers with carteira (see Table).  For workers without 
carteira the second method seems to overestimate this group, especially for older workers.  For 
the unemployed and the retired the same thing occurs, the difference is more important for the 
latter.  In the analysis we therefore opted for the first method. 
 
Age (2006)  Method 1  Method 2  Longitudinal data 
31-35  52,56  52,56  52,56 
36-40  52,54  49,53  51,49 
41-45  51,64  45,28  51,66 
46-50  48,90  39,04  49,44 
51-55  41,86  30,47  43,10 
56-60  30,46  21,19  30,93 
61-65  17,09  12,35  16,33 
66-70  4,80  4,29  4,35 
71+  0,93  0,95  0,87 
Source.  Authors’ calculations. 
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Annex 3:  First Order Expansions of the Behavioral Model 
 
Average Earnings (Contribution Density) 






Risk Aversion  ra  -8,371  1,236  Yes  0,02 
Time Pref  tp  -36,505  14,175  Yes  -0,06 
Consumption Pref  cp  0,280  0,561  No  0,03 
Prob Formal Work  pfw  -7,325  3,431  Yes  0,16 
Desutility effort  de  -10,495  2,372  Yes  -0,19 
Prob working if Retired  pwr  0,875  0,891  No  -0,01 
  ra^2  4,767  0,592  Yes   
  tp^2  -12,431  38,942  No   
  cp^2  0,094  0,367  No   
  pfw^2  8,481  2,094  Yes   
  de^2  12,876  3,101  Yes   
  pwr^2  -0,743  0,375  Yes   
  ra*tp  -9,774  8,615  No   
  ra*cp  0,137  0,449  No   
  ra*pfw  0,304  2,151  No   
  ra*de  -7,853  1,424  Yes   
  ra*pwr  0,916  0,974  No   
  tp*cp  57,347  12,499  Yes   
  tp*pfw  -38,562  14,188  Yes   
  tp*de  7,103  17,975  No   
  tp*pwr  -7,784  9,641  No   
  cp*pfw  0,292  0,625  No   
  cp*de  9,166  2,609  Yes   
  cp*pwr  0,839  1,100  No   
  pfw*de  -4,198  3,481  No   
  pfw*pwr  0,533  0,962  No   
  de*pwr  -0,035  3,177  No   
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50% Average Earnings (Contribution Density) 






Risk Aversion  ra  -11,683  1,659  Yes  0,05 
Time Pref  tp  -126,951  19,251  Yes  -0,05 
Consumption Pref  cp  47,129  10,349  Yes  0,06 
Prob Formal Work  pfw  10,385  4,124  Yes  0,13 
Desutility effort  de  -10,130  2,110  Yes  -0,12 
Prob working if Retired  pwr  -2,871  5,169  No  -0,02 
  ra^2  5,126  0,953  Yes   
  tp^2  -92,245  36,863  Yes   
  cp^2  -13,566  5,533  Yes   
  pfw^2  7,542  1,851  Yes   
  de^2  9,799  5,033  Yes   
  pwr^2  1,053  3,241  No   
  ra*tp  -1,408  14,314  No   
  ra*cp  -3,653  3,555  No   
  ra*pfw  1,137  1,379  No   
  ra*de  -1,446  2,944  No   
  ra*pwr  6,512  2,450  Yes   
  tp*cp  154,610  25,688  Yes   
  tp*pfw  11,149  14,747  No   
  tp*de  -62,848  20,094  Yes   
  tp*pwr  2,886  17,494  No   
  cp*pfw  -24,980  4,389  Yes   
  cp*de  1,106  6,341  No   
  cp*pwr  -17,995  4,093  Yes   
  pfw*de  2,212  3,124  No   
  pfw*pwr  6,727  1,913  Yes   
  de*pwr  -2,376  5,013  No   
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Average Earnings (Retirement Age) 






Risk Aversion  ra  -32.632  10.556  Yes  0.49 
Time Pref  tp  -138.140  75.649  Yes  -0.05 
Consumption Pref  cp  -69.417  15.568  Yes  0.78 
Prob Formal Work  pfw  16.286  11.963  No  -0.59 
Desutility effort  de  -108.627  19.705  Yes  -0.58 
Prob working if Retired  pwr  10.853  15.447  No  -1.16 
  ra^2  27.826  4.712  Yes   
  tp^2  -505.482  240.010  Yes   
  cp^2  27.056  11.507  Yes   
  pfw^2  5.299  9.047  No   
  de^2  -29.803  16.708  Yes   
  pwr^2  8.654  8.759  No   
  ra*tp  -92.287  55.214  Yes   
  ra*cp  25.915  8.129  Yes   
  ra*pfw  -39.321  4.502  Yes   
  ra*de  30.699  15.041  Yes   
  ra*pwr  -49.109  7.883  Yes   
  tp*cp  -40.377  92.944  No   
  tp*pfw  267.561  59.387  Yes   
  tp*de  -340.777  99.349  Yes   
  tp*pwr  175.527  48.989  Yes   
  cp*pfw  -2.054  16.712  No   
  cp*de  40.685  18.543  Yes   
  cp*pwr  9.091  11.980  No   
  pfw*de  91.222  12.322  Yes   
  pfw*pwr  70.820  11.214  Yes   
  de*pwr  -90.023  15.164  Yes   
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50% Average Earnings (Retirement Age) 






Risk Aversion  ra  -1.436  4.586  No  0.25 
Time Pref  tp  -9.669  32.673  No  -0.10 
Consumption Pref  cp  56.988  26.356  Yes  1.95 
Prob Formal Work  pfw  8.744  11.708  No  -0.06 
Desutility effort  de  -68.608  18.068  Yes  -0.04 
Prob working if Retired  pwr  -140.446  20.979  Yes  -2.08 
  ra^2  -0.206  2.893  No   
  tp^2  5.557  118.800  No   
  cp^2  -74.833  22.727  Yes   
  pfw^2  -6.770  3.570  Yes   
  de^2  -9.149  22.983  No   
  pwr^2  -130.697  16.001  Yes   
  ra*tp  1.926  25.382  No   
  ra*cp  -1.873  5.764  No   
  ra*pfw  -16.222  4.981  Yes   
  ra*de  30.072  10.201  Yes   
  ra*pwr  24.488  9.936  Yes   
  tp*cp  4.175  44.604  No   
  tp*pfw  105.327  21.437  Yes   
  tp*de  -465.807  92.913  Yes   
  tp*pwr  -43.854  78.415  No   
  cp*pfw  8.183  11.388  No   
  cp*de  -1.230  29.682  No   
  cp*pwr  201.251  26.392  Yes   
  pfw*de  46.814  13.430  Yes   
  pfw*pwr  52.609  10.637  Yes   
  de*pwr  -29.041  25.890  No   
Source.  Authors’ calculations. 
 